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Capital investments are among the 
most critical determinants ofcompet- 
itive advantage (Porter, 1992), in that 
they have long-term implications for 
firms in their generation of earnings 
through current and future returns. 
Because capital investments entail 
large outflows of cash, they arguably 
are related to firm returns and its 
fluctuation. However, the strategic 
management and financial perspec- 
tives often offer different explana- 
tions of the relationship between var- 
iations in firm returns and capital 
investments. From a strategic man- 
agement perspective, variations in 
cash flow and stock returns should af- 
fect the capital investments behavior 
of firms (Bromiley, 1986a, 1986b), 
and the integration of behavioral and 
contingency theories suggest that 
firms that vary capital investments in
response to organizational risk will 
outperform those that do not. In con- 
trast, the financial perspective indi- 
cates that variability in capital invest- 
ments in response to variability in 
cash flow is detrimental to the firm's 
value and should be eliminated, 
through edging, to stabilize capital 
investments patterns (Froot et al, 
1993, 1994). Therefore, in this study, 
our main purpose is to examine the 
relationships among organizational 
risk, variation in capital investments, 
and firm performance. 
We also analyze whether the organ- 
izational context matters in the rela- 
tionship between organizational risk 
and variability in capital investments. 
Researchers have contended that or- 
ganizational context strongly influ- 
ences business investment decisions 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 
1967; Noda and Bower, 1996; 
Steensma nd Corley, 2001). Our re- 
view of the literature indicates that 
firms that are more capital intensive, 
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possess more slack resources, and 
have greater employment variability 
will behave differently in relation to 
capital investments han will those 
with lower capital intensity, slack, 
and/or variability in employment 
(Noda and Bower, 1996; Steensma 
and Corley, 2001). We discuss how 
these contextual variables may mod- 
erate the relationship between organ- 
izational risk and variation in capital 
investments and empirically test the 
interaction effects. By linking capital 
intensity, slack, and variation in em- 
ployment with the risk-variability in 
capital investments relationship, we 
highlight the role of organizational 
contexts for capital investments deci- 
sions of the firm. 
The major contribution of this 
study lies in analyzing the organiza- 
tional risk-variability in capital invest- 
ments relationship over time using a 
large sample of pooled time-series 
data along the following two dimen- 
sions. First, we assess whether it is of 
benefit o the firm to vary its capital 
investments in response to risk - 
whether the interaction effect of risk 
and flexibility of investments on the 
long-term returns of the firm is posi- 
tive. This finding has significant im- 
plications for researchers, who might 
further explore the various condi- 
tions in which flexible investments 
improve firm performance, and for 
managers, who make decisions about 
capital investments. It also provides 
insights into when flexibility in in- 
vestments i  undesirable and when 
managers should act to stabilize in- 
vestments. Second, we empirically 
show that the risk-variability in invest- 
ment relationship is contingent on 
the organizational context, in that 
capital intensity accentuates the rela- 
tionship, whereas lack and variability 
in employment buffer it. Therefore, 
managers must be cognizant of the 
relevant organizational factors that 
may assist them in making their in- 
vestment flexibility decisions. In the 
following sections we discuss the the- 
oretical background, evelop hypoth- 
eses, explain methodology, and dis- 
cuss results. We also provide future 
research directions and managerial 
implications. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Risk and Variation in Capital 
Investments 
Palmer and Wiseman (1999) refer 
to organizational risk as the uncer- 
tainty of a firm's income stream or re- 
turns. This form of risk is distinct 
from managerial risk-taking or share- 
holder risk (Palmer and Wiseman, 
1999). Researchers note that varia- 
tion in firm returns is critical for an- 
alyzing firm-level orwithin-firm deci- 
sions (Miller and Bromiley, 1990; 
Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). Firm re- 
turns provide the enabling condi- 
tions for resource commitments be- 
cause, in addition to serving as 
indicators of the cash available from 
operations to fund investments, they 
influence the firm's ability to borrow. 
They also indicate (albeit noisily) the 
returns from prior investments, 
which may in turn be correlated with 
the quality of the firm's current in- 
vestment opportunities, provided 
they exist within the same area of ex- 
pertise. Therefore, reductions in a 
firm's returns generally result in 
lower levels of investments in re- 
sources, whereas increases in returns 
lead to increased investments. 
Variation in capital investments in- 
dicates how much firms have 
changed, or varied, their capital in- 
vestments over time in relation to 
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their average investment levels. 
Greater variability indicates greater 
fluctuations around the mean, 
whereas lower variability represents 
more stable investment patterns. 
Therefore, a firm with greater varia- 
tion in capital investments i  either 
more flexible in its capital invest- 
ments pattern, or has been making 
more changes in its capital invest- 
ments, than is a firm with lower vari- 
ation in capital investments, which in- 
dicates either investment stability or 
inability or unwillingness to invest. 
Both strategic management and fi- 
nance literature suggest similar ra- 
tionales for the relationship between 
organizational risk and capital invest- 
ments. The behavioral theory of the 
firm, while discussing the processes of 
decision making in organizations, in- 
dicates that firm returns are major de- 
terminants of managerial choices 
about resource commitments (Cyert 
and March, 1963). If the returns are 
unstable, investments are affected as 
well because problem-driven search 
continues until a satisfying alternative 
is found (Greve, 2003). Therefore, if 
firm returns do not match expecta- 
tions, investment patterns are 
changed until a satisfactory solution 
is found. This suggests that variation 
in firm returns will positively affect 
variation in capital investments deci- 
sions and that, over time, capital in- 
vestments will vary along with the var- 
iation in firm returns - they will be 
high when firm returns are high and 
low when firm returns are low. 
Similarly, financial iterature has 
shown that capital investments are 
sensitive to cash flow (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994; Fazzari et al, 1988) and 
liquidity (Cleary, 1999). Froot and his 
co-authors emphasize that "variabil- 
ity in internal cash flow must result in 
either: (a) variability in the amount 
of money raised externally or (b) var- 
iability in the amount of investment" 
(1993: 1630). Firm returns affect cash 
flow and the overall liquidity of the 
firm; consequently, variation in capi- 
tal investments should be affected by 
the variation in firm returns. When 
returns are low, firms must ration 
capital according to their limited cash 
flow, and only a few projects (usually 
those with the highest returns) get 
funded. Greater returns provide 
firms with more money to invest and 
reduce the need for capital rationing. 
Therefore, higher firm returns lead 
to more projects getting accepted 
and funded. In addition, profitability 
increases the borrowing capacity of 
the firm. The ability to take on more 
debt enables additional investments, 
beyond those that can be funded by 
profits. The inability to borrow, due 
to lower profitability, may constrain 
investment even further than the re- 
duction in investment that is directly 
due to lower profits. 
Therefore we hypothesize that or- 
ganizational risk will positively affect 
variation in capital investments. 
Hypothesis 1: Organizational risk is positively 
related with variation in capital investments. 
Two caveats are in order. First, re- 
actions to adjusted capital invest- 
ments may occur with a time lag as 
the interpretation and reaction pro- 
cess unfolds in managerial decision 
making. Because variation in capital 
investments represents the invest- 
ment profile of the firm over a period 
of time, decision lags can be captured 
by the pattern of variability. In other 
words, the association between varia- 
tion in firm returns and variation in 
capital investments i not strictly a 
point-to-point relationship; rather, it 
is a relationship between a pattern of 
variation in firm returns and a pat- 
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tern of variation in capital invest- 
ments (Bedeian and Mossholder, 
2000) . Second, adjustments in capital 
investments may not be entirely 
planned; often, managers are forced 
to cut back or expand on the basis of 
market demands and other condi- 
tions. Therefore, flexibility in invest- 
ments may occur not only by choice, 
but by circumstance aswell. 
Risk, Variation in Capital 
Investments and Firm Performance 
Past studies on risk and firm per- 
formance have yielded conflicting re- 
sults. Although some early financial 
portfolio studies have shown that 
greater risk is associated with greater 
returns (Aaker and Jacobson, 1987; 
Marsh and Swanson, 1984), others 
have questioned this positive associa- 
tion and have found negative rela- 
tions between firm risk and returns 
(Bowman, 1980, 1982; Bromiley, 
1991). The conflicting findings have 
led researchers to explore and ex- 
amine factors that potentially impact 
the risk-returns relationship. Bow- 
man (1982) looked at factors related 
to specific managerial behavior in 
"troubled firms" as well as strategic 
decision-making skill, while Fiegen- 
baum and Thomas (1986) proposed 
that environmental forces play a role. 
The risk-returns relationship, how- 
ever, continues to be one of the un- 
resolved "black box" issues as no 
consensus has emerged over time. 
In view of the above controversy, a 
critical question that we examine is 
whether firms that vary their capital 
investments inresponse to organiza- 
tional risk are more successful than 
those that do not. Whereas the stra- 
tegic management and finance per- 
spectives converge in their predic- 
tions about the relationship between 
organizational risk and capital invest- 
ments, they part ways in their assess- 
ments about performance effects. 
Strategic researchers, using a behav- 
ioral contingency approach, have 
suggested that to remain competitive, 
organizations must change their re- 
source commitments inkeeping with 
rapid changes in business environ- 
ments (Rindova and Kotha, 2001; 
Teece et al, 1997). In dynamic envi- 
ronments, established paradigms 
about the sustainability of competi- 
tive advantage and stable resource 
commitments may have limited use- 
fulness, and flexibility and adaptabil- 
ity may contribute more to long-term 
success. For firms experiencing 
greater uncertainty in returns, flexi- 
bility in investments would enable 
them to maintain their competitive 
advantage, because outlay would be 
adjusted according to income stream. 
If the enabling conditions for stable 
capital investments donot exist, firms 
that adjust their resource commit- 
ments in response to shifts in demand 
may be more successful in maintain- 
ing their competitive advantage be- 
cause the new resource combinations 
could achieve a better fit with the 
changed business conditions. There- 
fore, when variation in firm returns is 
high, firms that respond by varying 
their capital investments are ex- 
pected to achieve a greater level of 
success than are firms that do not ad- 
just their capital investments behav- 
ior pattern. 
However, the financial approach 
considers variability in capital invest- 
ments as undesirable because of the 
"diminishing marginal returns to in- 
vestments," though only "to the ex- 
tent that output is a concave function 
of investment" (Froot et al, 1993: 
1630); in other words, output goes 
down when capital investments go 
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down, leading to less optimal returns 
in case of variations. Froot and his co- 
authors (1993, 1994) acknowledge 
that, in an uncertain market, changes 
in business conditions may alter or 
shift he function altogether. None- 
theless, according to the financial ap- 
proach, when variation in returns is 
high, firms that respond by varying 
their capital investments will achieve 
a lower level of success than those 
that employ any other organizational 
risk - variation in capital investments 
combination because variability of in- 
vestments i detrimental for returns. 
In fact the financial perspective rec- 
ommends hedging as a risk manage- 
ment strategy to stabilize capital in- 
vestments when cash flow is 
uncertain. 
These two competing views on risk, 
variation in capital investments and 
firm performance, are reflected in 
the following alternate hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Variation in capital invest- 
ments will positively moderate the relation- 
ship between organizational risk and firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: Variation in capital invest- 
ments will negatively moderate the relation- 
ship between organizational risk and firm 
performance. 
The Organizational Context 
Researchers have found that the 
organizational context has a signifi- 
cant influence on business invest- 
ment decisions. Bower (1970) argues 
that capital investments are con- 
strained by the organizational struc- 
ture and systems in place. Noda and 
Bower (1996) show that resource 
commitment processes are critically 
influenced by the strategic and struc- 
tural contexts of the organization. 
Therefore, it is likely that the rela- 
tionship between organizational risk 
and variation in capital investments 
will be affected by the organizational 
context. Firms may be more or less 
able to withstand the effect of uncer- 
tainty of returns on the basis of cer- 
tain organizational factors. We sug- 
gest that capital intensity, availability 
of slack resources, and variability in 
employment level of the firm will 
moderate the relationship between 
risk and capital investments. Capital 
intensity represents the operating lev- 
erage of the firm, and may play a sig- 
nificant role in determining whether 
or not capital investments are af- 
fected by income-stream uncertainty. 
A long stream of research on organi- 
zational slack suggests that the invest- 
ment choices made by managers may 
be enabled or constrained depending 
on the availability of slack resources 
within the organization (Steensma 
and Corley, 2001). Similarly, prior re- 
search indicates that investments in
capital assets may be associated with 
changes in human capital (Caseio et 
ai, 1997; Kallapur and Trombley, 
1999). Therefore we examine the 
moderating effect of these three or- 
ganizational contexts (capital inten- 
sity, availability of slack, and level of 
employment) on the relationship be- 
tween organizational risk and varia- 
bility in capital investments. 
Capital Intensity. Capital intensity, 
or the level of physical assets, repre- 
sents the operating leverage of the 
firm (Barton and Gordon, 1988) and 
indicates the proportion of fixed to 
variable costs. Because capital assets 
are usually fixed and irreversible in
nature, greater capital intensity de- 
notes higher fixed costs and resource 
commitments and more pressure on 
the cash flow of the firm. In many 
capital-intensive industries, the in- 
vestment level is not only high but oc- 
curs in a concentrated manner, so 
that firms invest in big projects in 
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good years but cut back in lean years 
because of their high fixed costs. 
Because capital-intensive firms are 
characterized by an emphasis on the 
capital budget, we suggest that they 
are more likely to be sensitive to 
changes in firm returns and variation 
in profitability. We therefore expect 
that the capital intensity of the firm 
will further accentuate the effect of 
firm returns uncertainty on capital in- 
vestments decisions. Firms that have 
greater levels of capital assets will re- 
act more to decreased profitability 
because they have higher fixed costs, 
which makes their capital budgets 
more sensitive to changes in the in- 
come stream. Therefore, firms with 
high capital intensity will cut back 
more on capital investments during 
periods of low profitability and invest 
more during profit upswings. 
Hypothesis 3: Greater organizational risk is 
associated with greater variation in capital 
investments when capital intensity is high 
than when it is low. 
Organizational Slack. An organiza- 
tion's excess resources, which buffer 
the firm from external shocks and 
changes, are referred to as slack. Be- 
havioral theory argues that slack pro- 
vides a cushion that enables firms to 
maintain stability when faced with 
performance variability (Cyert and 
March, 1963), which indicates a neg- 
ative relationship between firm re- 
turn uncertainty and organizational 
slack. Empirically, Bromiley (1991) 
and Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) 
find negative associations between 
various measures of slack and organ- 
izational risk; Palmer and Wiseman 
(1999) find a negative relationship 
between slack and managerial risk- 
taking. 
Accordingly, we expect that organ- 
izational slack will buffer the effect of 
organizational risk on capital invest- 
ments decisions. Firms with high lev- 
els of slack may not need to vary their 
capital investments decisions as fre- 
quently in response to variation in 
their returns for two reasons. First, as 
predicted by behavioral theory, 
higher levels of slack make the firm 
less sensitive to fluctuations inthe en- 
vironment. Therefore, firms can ab- 
sorb income stream uncertainty to 
some extent and show less variation 
in their capital investments in re- 
sponse to organizational risk. Second, 
slack is inherently more variable than 
capital investments because it consists 
of excess resources that may not have 
immediate uses, whereas capital in- 
vestments refer to long-term capabil- 
ities (Maritan, 2001). During periods 
of low and high profitability, slack can 
more easily be cut back or added to 
than capital assets, so a firm would 
vary its slack assets before its capital 
investments. Therefore, we expect 
that firms with more slack resources 
will exhibit less variation in capital in- 
vestments in response to organiza- 
tional risk. 
Hypothesis 4: Greater organizational risk is 
associated with greater variation in capital 
investments when slack is low than when it 
is high. 
Variability in Employment Scholars 
have suggested that investment deci- 
sions for physical and human assets 
are related. For example, Kallapur 
and Trombley (1999) argue that a 
firm's investment opportunity set, 
which consists of the ratio of capital 
expenditure to assets, among other 
measures, depends on firm-specific 
factors uch as the physical and hu- 
man capital in place. Caseio, Young, 
and Morris (1997) demonstrate that 
firms are more successful when they 
make changes in their employment 
along with changes in their capital as- 
sets, and Koch and McGrath (1996) 
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suggest that firms often leverage la- 
bor with greater capital assets. These 
arguments prompt us to examine 
whether the relationship between var- 
iation in firm returns and variation in 
capital investments i  affected by 
changes in the employment levels of 
the firm. 
Variability in employment demon- 
strates the firm's flexibility in adjust- 
ing its level of employment; greater 
variability represents greater fluctua- 
tions in employee numbers over time, 
whereas lesser variability suggests rel- 
atively fixed levels of employment 
(Gerhart and Trevor, 1996). Firms 
may use part-time or contractual em- 
ployees or resort to frequent hiring 
and firing to adjust their levels of em- 
ployment according to fluctuations in
demand and supply. Financial itera- 
ture on operating leverage indicates 
that investments incapital assets are 
inherently less reversible than are in- 
vestments in people, which implies 
that capital is less variable than labor 
(Dugan and Shriver, 1992). There- 
fore, it may be easier for a firm to 
change its employment level than its 
level of capital investments. Accord- 
ingly, we expect that firms with 
greater employment variability will 
have less variation in capital invest- 
ments in response to organizational 
risk. 
Hypothesis 5: Greater organizational risk is 
associated with greater variation in capital 
investments when variability in employment 
is low than when it is high. 
A model with all of our proposed 
relationships is shown in Figure I. 
This figure not only highlights the in- 
dividual hypotheses, but puts all our 
hypotheses together in the same con- 
textual framework. 
METHODS 
We applied panel data analysis 
techniques (Markus, 1979) on 
pooled cross-sectional (firm), time-se- 
ries (year) data from Standard and 
Poor's COMPUSTAT annual data- 
base for the period 1985-2002. We 
chose this period to represent several 
business cycles, so that sporadic or oc- 
casional fluctuations inan economic 
cycle would not bias the variability 
patterns. All firms included in the 
sample satisfied two criteria. First, 
they have (a) positive values for cap- 
ital expenditure, (b) property, plant, 
and equipment, (c) total assets, (d) 
net sales, selling, and general admin- 
istrative expenses, (e) total debt, (f) 
total equity, (g) market price of stock 
as of closing day, and (h) employee 
numbers. Second, no firms were miss- 
ing time series data for the chosen pe- 
riod on these variables. 
Measures 
Organizational Risk. We used two 
measures of uncertainty of returns - 
one accounting measure, variance in 
the return on equity (ROE), and one 
market-based measure, variance in 
market price of stock as on the finan- 
cial closing day. Earlier research has 
used both variability of firm profita- 
bility and volatility of stock prices as 
representing firm risk (Bowman, 
1980; Arend, 2004). Return on equity 
is computed as operating income be- 
fore extraordinary items divided by 
net equity. We calculated the variance 
in ROE and variance in market price 
of stock over the previous five years. 
For example for firm 1-1990 obser- 
vation, variance in ROE is over 1985- 
89. Factor scores of these two meas- 
ures were used to create an overall 
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measure of risk (see Table 1) because 
they have an advantage over scales, in 
that they represent the shared vari- 
ance between factors (Miller and 
Bromiley, 1990). 
Capital Investments. Variance of an- 
nual capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
and annual value of property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE) are two meas- 
ures of variation in capital invest- 
ments. Commonly used as a proxy 
measure for capital investments in fi- 
nancial literature (Cleary, 1999), 
CAPEX represents funds used for ad- 
ditions to property, plant, and equip- 
ment (excluding amounts from ac- 
quisitions) during a year. In turn, 
PPE represents the amount of capital 
assets held by a firm each year and is 
a proxy for the capital investments of 
the firm in prior years. The variance 
of CAPEX and PPE were calculated 
over the previous five years (i.e., the 
firm 1-1990 variance is over 1985-89). 
We used factor scores of the two var- 
iance measures of capital investments 
to compute an aggregate measure of 
variation in capital investments (see 
Table 1). 
Firm Performance. Firm perform- 
ance was measured by averaging the 
return on assets (ROA) and return on 
sales (ROS) over the current year and 
last two years (e.g., 1987 firm per- 
formance is the average of 1985-87). 
Averaging firm performance over a 
time period smoothes out fluctua- 
tions in performance and ensures 
that the overall performance level is 
reflected (Shen and Cannella, 2002). 
We computed the factor scores of the 
two profitability measures to obtain 
an aggregate measure for firm per- 
formance, as seen in Table 1 (Miller 
and Bromiley, 1990). 
Organizational Contexts and Control 
Variables. Following several past stud- 
ies, we used the ratio of property, 
plant, and equipment to total assets 
as the measure for capital intensity 
(Barton, 1988). Scholars have pro- 
posed a number of measures of or- 
ganizational slack, from which we 
chose Bourgeois' (1981) conceptual- 
ization of slack through deliberate ac- 
tion of managers because it fits with 
our research emphasis of investment 
behavior. Bourgeois (1981) noted 
that an increase in general and ad- 
ministrative expenses would indicate 
management's injection of slack into 
the system by their investment in 
more overhead items. Therefore, we 
measured slack as selling and general 
administrative expenses over sales 
(Steensma and Corley, 2001), also 
known as recoverable slack (Geiger 
and Cashen, 2002). Variability of em- 
ployment (Gerhart and Trevor, 1996) 
was measured as the variance of total 
number of employees over the last 
five years. 
Four control variables are included 
in our models. First, to account for 
industry-level differences in the capi- 
tal investments behavior of firms, we 
controlled for industry, using the two- 
digit standard industrial classification 
(SIC). Second, because previous re- 
search has shown that firm size is a 
significant predictor of firm perform- 
ance and variation in stock returns 
(Fama and French, 1992), we con- 
trolled for firm size, measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total number 
of employees averaged over time. 
Third, we controlled for sales growth 
for each year during the period of 
our study because sales growth may 
have a significant impact on the in- 
vestment behavior of the firm. 
Higher sales growth may prompt 
managers to invest in extra capacity 
while lower sales may induce curtail- 
ment of physical assets. Fourth and fi- 
nally, we controlled for debt-equity, 
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the leverage ratio of the firm. Debt- 
equity ratio indicates how the invest- 
ments are financed - a high ratio 
shows more borrowed capital, while a 
low ratio signifies more equity financ- 
ing. Either way it may have limiting 
effects on investment patterns. For 
example, high debt restricts the ca- 
pacity to borrow more, while high eq- 
uity may lead to dilution of equity and 
lower the capacity to raise money 
from the markets. Therefore, we con- 
trolled for its effect. 
Data and Analysis 
Five initial years of data (1985- 
1989) were lost due to calculation of 
variance measures (i.e., variance 
measures were available from 1990). 
In addition, to include appropriate 
time lags in the data (in keeping with 
our argument that investment deci- 
sions and performance effects occur 
with a lag), we lagged firm perform- 
ance measures by a year in relation to 
risk-variation i  capital investments 
measures (i.e., for 1991 firm perform- 
ance, the risk and variation in capital 
investments measure of 1990 was 
taken). Therefore, the final dataset 
consisted of 1,284 firms, each with 
twelve years of data (1991-2002), re- 
sulting in 15,408 firm-year observa- 
tions. Forty-seven industries at two- 
digit SIC level were represented in 
the data. These include primary in- 
dustries (SIC 10, 13, 14, 16), manu- 
facturing (SIC 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 
38, 39), transportation and utilities 
(SIC 42, 48, 49), trade, retail, and au- 
tomotive dealers (50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 
55, 56, 57, 58, 59) , banking, financial, 
and real estate (61, 62, 65, 67), serv- 
ices (70, 73, 76, 78,79), and public ad- 
ministration a d miscellaneous (SIC 
80,87,99). 
We used the SAS procedure 
TSCSREG (time-series, cross-section 
regression), which analyzes panel 
data sets that consist of multiple time- 
series observations on each of several 
cross-sectional units (firms in this 
case). This procedure requires that 
each firm has the same number of 
time-series observations. Since ordi- 
nary least squares estimates of panel 
data can result in biased estimates 
due to the non-independence of er- 
rors within cross-sections, this proce- 
dure employs Hausman's test for ran- 
dom effects with autoregressive 
errors, and provides generalized least 
squares estimates. For testing the 
moderating effects, the products of 
the standardized variables were used 
as interaction terms (Cohen and Co- 
hen, 1983) in PROC TSCSREG. 
RESULTS 
The results of our analysis are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. The corre- 
lations, means, and standard devia- 
tions are in Table 2. As we expected, 
the measures of organizational risk 
are positively correlated with the 
measures of variation in capital in- 
vestments. Hypothesis 1, which pos- 
tulates a positive relationship be- 
tween organizational risk and 
variation in capital investments, is
supported (see Table 3). The coeffi- 
cient estimate of overall risk is posi- 
tive and significant for variation in 
capital investments (regression coef- 
ficient = .04, p < .05), and the r- 
square for the model is .17. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b postulate 
two competing views regarding the ef- 
fect of the risk - variation in capital 
investments relationship on long- 
term firm performance. First, we find 
that organizational risk is negatively 
related to firm performance (regres- 
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sion coefficient = -.03, p < .05), con- 
sistent with the effects that Miller and 
Bromiley (1990) found (see Table 3). 
Similarly, variation in capital invest- 
ments is negatively related to firm 
performance (regression coefficient = -.10, p < .001). The interaction be- 
tween risk and variation in capital in- 
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vestments i significant and positive 
(regression coefficient .= .09, p < 
.001) for firm performance, and the 
r-square for the model is .08. Because 
our main effects are consistent with 
previous research, we believe that our 
data partially support Hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 3, which predicts a pos- 
itive moderating effect of capital in- 
tensity on the relationship between 
organizational risk and variation in 
capital investments, i  supported (see 
Table 3) . The coefficient ofthe inter- 
action of risk and capital intensity is 
positive and significant (regression 
coefficient = .02, p < .05). Hypothe- 
sis 4, which predicts a negative mod- 
erating effect of organizational slack 
on the risk variation in capital invest- 
ments relationship, also is supported 
(see Table 3) . The coefficient of the 
interaction of risk and slack is nega- 
tive and significant (regression coef- 
ficient = -.03, p < .01). Hypothesis 5, 
which asserts that variability in em- 
ployment negatively moderates the 
relationship between variation in 
profitability and variation in capital 
investments, i  supported (see Table 
3). The results how that die regres- 
sion coefficient of the interaction 
term between variability in employ- 
ment and organizational risk is neg- 
ative and significant (-.02, p < .05). 
We followed the procedure out- 
lined by Aiken and West (1991) to 
graphically interpret interaction 
terms in Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3, 4, and 
5. We plotted two lines for each in- 
teraction effect: one for high and the 
other for low levels of the moderator 
variable. The high and low values 
(mean ± standard eviation) of the 
dependent variable (y-axis) were plot- 
ted against high and low values of the 
independent variable (x-axis). The 
direction and intersection of the re- 
sulting lines are shown in Figures II, 
III, IV, and V. Firm performance is 
high when high-risk firms show 
greater variation in capital invest- 
ments (Figure II) . This indicates that 
firms that face high risk and can vary 
their capital investments are more 
successful. Variation in capital invest- 
ments is high when both capital in- 
tensity and organizational risk are 
high (Figure III). Therefore, capital 
intensity has a positive moderating ef- 
fect on the risk-variation in a capital 
investments relationship. Variation in 
capital investments is high when slack 
is low and organizational risk is high 
(Figure IV), which indicates a nega- 
tive moderating effect of slack. Fi- 
nally, variation in capital investments 
is high when variability in employ- 
ment is low and organizational risk is 
high (Figure V), which indicates a 
negative moderating effect of varia- 
bility in employment on the organi- 
zational risk - capital investments re- 
lationship. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Research Implications 
We studied the relationship among 
organizational risk, variation in capi- 
tal investments, and firm perform- 
ance using competing perspectives 
from strategic management and fi- 
nance. Consistent with both strategic 
management and financial manage- 
ment, we find that firms with greater 
organizational risk are associated 
with greater variations in capital in- 
vestments. On the other hand, these 
two literatures predict different out- 
comes for the interaction effects of 
the organizational risk - variation in 
capital investments relationship on 
firm performance. The contingency 
dynamic fit perspective in strategic 
management suggests that firms that 
JOURNAL OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES Vol. XVIII Number 1 Spring 2006 
76 Bhattacharya and Wheatley 
Figure II 
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Figure IV 
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make adjustments to their invest- 
ments in response to income stream 
uncertainty will be more profitable in 
the long run (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Thomp- 
son, 1967). However, in the finance 
literature, Froot et al (1993, 1994) 
suggest that firms hould aim to sta- 
bilize their investment patterns for 
greater returns. 
Accordingly, we tested two compet- 
ing hypotheses for the interaction ef- 
fect of risk-variation in capital invest- 
ments on firm performance: one 
stating that continuous adjustment to 
capital investments inresponse to in- 
come stream uncertainty would influ- 
ence firm performance in a positive 
manner, the other just the opposite. 
Consistent with the strategic manage- 
ment perspective, our results show 
that high organizational risk firms 
with higher variation in capital in- 
vestments outperform low-risk firms 
with high variation in capital invest- 
ments, and that low-risk firms with 
lower variation in capital investments 
outperform high-risk firms with lower 
variation in capital investments. We 
have faith in this finding, because our 
main effects behave in a manner akin 
to the effects found in other studies 
that examine similar relationships. 
Therefore, our findings lend more 
credence to the contingency fit ap- 
proach in strategic management - 
the high risk - high variation in cap- 
ital investments and low risk - low 
variation in capital investments com- 
binations seem to generate higher 
levels of performance, in contrast o 
the high risk - low variations in capi- 
tal investments orlow risk - high var- 
iation in capital investments. 
We also find that the organiza- 
tional contexts of capital intensity, 
slack, and variation in employment 
moderate the relationship between 
variation in profitability and capital 
investments. By indicating that firms 
with greater capital intensity and 
greater risk have greater variation in 
their capital investments decisions, 
the results reaffirm the assertion that 
capital-intensive firms, which have 
greater operational leverage, are 
more sensitive to risk (Lev, 1974; Mil- 
ler and Bromiley, 1990). Firms with 
more organizational slack exhibit less 
variation in capital investments inre- 
sponse to risk, consistent with the be- 
havioral theory prediction that 
greater slack enables firms to absorb 
greater risks (Cyert and March, 
1963). Finally, we find that firms that 
exhibit greater variability in employ- 
ment respond less to risk in relation 
to capital investments. This finding 
supports our position that capital in- 
vestments are inherently less flexible 
than is employment and, therefore, 
firms that respond to greater risk with 
greater variability in employment ex- 
hibit less variation in capital invest- 
ments. The results also show that 
firms with greater income stream un- 
certainty and those that make more 
changes in employment make fewer 
changes in their capital assets. 
Managerial Implications 
From a practitioner's point of view, 
our findings have several significant 
implications. First, managers should 
be aware that the level of organiza- 
tional risk determines the variability 
in capital expenditures. Therefore, 
they should monitor isk closely. Sec- 
ond, because low variation in capital 
investments incombination with low 
organizational risk and high variation 
in capital investments in combination 
with high organizational risk outper- 
form other combinations of risk-vari- 
ation in capital investments, manag- 
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ers in low-risk situations should 
consider strategies for stabilizing 
their capital investments, while those 
in high-risk firms hould be ready to 
vary their capital expenditure. This 
key finding suggests that managers of 
low-risk firms must understand the 
importance of stabilizing their capital 
investments and decide on strategies 
for doing so. For example, they may 
use financial hedging tools like op- 
tions for their capital investments 
(e.g., oil companies often lease their 
drilling sites instead of buying them 
outright in order to stabilize invest- 
ments over a long period and not 
stagger it in any one period) . In con- 
trast, managers of high-risk organi- 
zations eem to perform better when 
they are flexible enough to vary their 
capital investments. Clearly, this en- 
tails a different set of strategies for 
their capital investments processes. 
For example, they should invest heav- 
ily during rising returns and cut back 
during downturns. 
Finally, the moderating context 
variables provide significant guidance 
for managing variability in capital in- 
vestments. Managers should there- 
fore pay close attention to these or- 
ganizational contexts before deciding 
their strategy. We find that in capital 
intensive firms the variability in capi- 
tal investments inresponse to organ- 
izational risk is accentuated. This is 
good for high-risk firms but may cre- 
ate problems for low-risk firms. In ei- 
ther case, managers should factor in 
the effect of capital intensity in their 
strategy for capital investments. On 
the other hand, our results how that 
slack resources and variability in em- 
ployment buffer the effect of risk on 
variability in capital investments. This 
helps low-risk firms to stabilize their 
capital investments pattern, so these 
firms hould adopt strategies to in- 
crease slack and employment varia- 
bility. For example, the retail indus- 
try, where variability of returns is low 
(compared to say, computer manu- 
facturers), primarily uses employ- 
ment variability to adjust to seasonal 
variations in cash flow; they restruc- 
ture capital investments only when 
there is a need for major strategic 
changes. However, a high-risk firm 
with high slack and employment var- 
iability may see somewhat reduced 
performance effects of risk-variability 
in capital investments interaction. 
For example, a technology firm (e.g., 
computer hardware manufacturer) 
would have a cyclical pattern of capi- 
tal investments in keeping with the cy- 
clical returns. 
Limitations and Scope for Future 
Research 
It is appropriate here to point out 
some limitations of our study that 
should be addressed through future 
research. First, methodologically, 
capital expenditures, the value of 
plant, property, and equipment, and 
capital expenditures over sales are 
broad approximations of the capital 
investments decisions of a firm. This 
is a shortcoming of accounting data 
in itself, because such data, due to ag- 
gregation and other adjustments, in- 
evitably lose some of their richness. A 
more fine-grained analysis of differ- 
ent types of capital expenditures may 
provide a better picture of how capi- 
tal investments decisions vary over 
time. For example, maintenance and 
replacement expenses may be disag- 
gregated from expenses for new cap- 
ital assets. Internal firm data or other 
secondary sources may reveal what 
percentage of capital expenditures is 
spent on investments a opposed to 
routine maintenance, replacements, 
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or additions. Furthermore, qualita- 
tive or survey data may indicate 
whether managers intentionally vary 
capital investments decisions in re- 
sponse to risk - that is, to what extent 
the variation in capital investments is 
intended or forced. 
Second, we focus on two dimen- 
sions of organizational risk - varia- 
tion in returns on equity and varia- 
tions in market price of stock. 
Bromiley, Miller, and Rau (2001) 
provide a nice summary of the differ- 
ent types of risk constructs, and rep- 
licating this study using alternate 
specifications of risk, like perceptual 
risk, and managerial risk-taking (Pal- 
mer and Wiseman, 1999), may en- 
hance the validity of our findings. In 
the future, researchers should also ex- 
plore more organizational context var- 
iables that may affect the risk-variation 
in capital investments relationship. For 
example, human capital factors - such 
as managerial demographics, experi- 
ence, risk-taking propensity (i.e., how 
managers respond to risk) (Palmer 
and Wiseman, 1999), a firm's com- 
petitive position, and other contex- 
tual variables suggested by Cyert and 
March (1963) - such as aspiration 
and expectation levels of managers - 
may affect his relationship. 
Third, an interesting research 
question that arises from our study is: 
do firms in different industries be- 
have differently in their capital in- 
vestments decisions in response to 
risk? We have assumed an industry ef- 
fect and have controlled for it be- 
cause the focus of our study is more 
on the overall risk-variation n capital 
investments relationship. However, 
an inter-industry as well as intra-in- 
dustry analysis may throw additional 
light on this relationship. 
Limitations aside, this study is the 
first in the risk literature to explicitly 
investigate the organizational risk- 
variation in capital investments rela- 
tionship at the firm-level from a lon- 
gitudinal perspective. Although, in 
practice, firms resort o adjustments 
in capital budgets in view of uncertain 
profitability and market returns, no 
study has analyzed this relationship. 
Mari tan (2001) studied the capital in- 
vestments decision-making process in 
relation to the uncertainty associated 
with an investment project, but the 
level of analysis was individual pro- 
jects. We explicitly focus on the pat- 
tern of capital investments behavior 
in the form of variation in capital in- 
vestments, which has not been ex- 
plored previously. Therefore, our 
study opens up a new research area 
for the strategic management litera- 
ture. 
Our study also expands research 
on organizational risk by investigat- 
ing it as an explanatory variable for 
strategic investment decisions and 
showing that it is a significant predic- 
tor of variation in capital investments 
(a major resource-commitment deci- 
sion of the firm) . Following the tra- 
dition of Bowman (1980, 1982) and 
other researchers, we show that the 
organizational risk-firm performance 
relationship can be better under- 
stood by examining the context of the 
firm, in that we find that low-risk 
firms that vary their capital invest- 
ments are outperformed by high-risk 
firms that vary their capital invest- 
ments. Additionally, the revelations 
about the moderating effects of three 
contextual variables - capital inten- 
sity, slack, and variability in employ- 
ment - shed more light on the risk- 
capital investments behavior of firms. 
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